Pictured: KPop star YG is forced into retirement and a public apology for his drug abuse.
The Koreans, much like the rest of the Confucian world (China, Taiwan, Japan), are pretty serious about drugs. Today it is still not unusual to see celebrities publicly shamed for drug consumption. They can often entirely lose face as a result of being discovered consuming drugs. To Western audiences used to the casual promotion of drug abuse in popular culture, this may seem draconian, but as the British and Dutch examples will show in an upcoming article, the power and influence of popular culture can have far-reaching ripple effects, and can strongly influence the acceptability of certain behaviours. The Koreans are well aware of this, and the power of public figures to create examples for youth culture and behaviour in general. They have responded by totally prohibiting the promotion of drug consumption. What follows will be a relatively technical breakdown of the shape of the Korean drug policy regime, a regime shaped through social shaming and executive power, created by a dictator wishing to cleanse drugs from the land, a policy which has proved highly successful, though possibly at a cost no Westerner would be willing to pay.
The Republic of Korea has centralised almost every aspect of their drugs programme, from policing to prosecution, from education to public relations. While they do not use the death penalty to the extent that other Asian nations do, they do reserve it for large-scale amphetamine manufacturing. They manage a general, holistic programme out of the Supreme Prosecutor’s Office, a body over which the presidency has substantial control, and have representatives in several branches of the civil service from customs to diplomacy. Since the strict regime of drug punishment was established under the strongman dictator Park Chun-hee, who carried Korea into its most prosperous era, and who is still relatively popular, patriotism is the solid bedrock upon which the Korean drug regime lies. Having established combination of punitive measures and public shaming in the 1960s, subsequent changes in strategy only escalated policy, increasing resources and centralising efforts while diversifying their reach.
More academic research is written in English about drug policy in the North than in the South. This strange turn can be chalked up to the international significance of the Communist regime, which since the 1970s exported methamphetamine and heroin[1], an has relied on the trade for regime survival since 1990[2]. I also strongly suspect that this is because Western academics are largely in favour of Liberalisation, and don’t like inconvenient counterexamples. It can’t be the language barrier, or difficult paperwork, since both of those are pretty serious issues for studying the North.
The South suffers the unfortunate burden of sharing a border with the DPRK, as well as China, whose production of methamphetamine has increased significantly since 2012[3]. Even before the Park military dictatorship, drug trafficking was seen as a tool of communist aggression. One scholar referred to this as the “war on red drugs” and argues that, together with memories of humiliation under Japanese occupation and its opium monopoly, the deterrence strategy is thus strongly tied to feelings of national pride, and seen in many respects as a foreign relations area. This is something the Far Eastern nations share – the notion that drugs are an existential threat to the community and the nation. Undoubtedly, this is the result of a common memory of the late 19th to early 20th century – first and foremost, the opium wars in China. The Japanese efforts to destroy opium addiction as they opened up trade and began colonial expansion consisted of declaring an opium monopoly and exporting to subservient nations before weaning them off, a surprisingly successful strategy.
The Koreans have consequently taken narcotics policy extremely seriously. Their sentencing code consists of imposing a maximum sentence of one year for personal possession of cannabis, a maximum of ten for opiates, and a maximum of ten plus a fine of 2 million won for synthetic drugs. For manufacture and trade, the sentencing is more severe: a mandatory minimum one year for cannabis cultivation, seven years to life for drug smuggling, and ten years to life or the death penalty for the manufacturing of synthetic drugs (these Russian scholars do a nice breakdown of the laws). An interesting feature is that prosecution guidelines suggest intoxication as an aggravating rather than mitigating factor in other crimes – being high doesn’t mean half the capacity for judgement, it means twice the crime[45]. An utterly unique feature of the penal code is the prosecution of citizens for crimes committed outside of the state’s territory[7]. This is a particular issue considering how the drug culture of the West appears to be driving experimentation and consumption in recent years.
Until 1957 when the first domestic laws were codified, the drug laws were codified under the US Military Code, a product of the American occupation during the Korean War. The modern Korean anti-drug policy however, began under the military dictatorship of Park Chun-hee. Park served in the Japanese army during the occupation of Manchuria, which had a formative influence in his governing strategy after seizing power in 1961[8]. The Park government engaged in political purges and the shutting down of all political activity, the closure of bars, coffee shops, and brothels; a general crackdown on all forms of social deviance[9]. This was partially in response to Korea’s first major drug epidemic, methadone, and partially a raw power grab. To combat the growing methadone crisis, in 1966 the state arrested approximately 36,000 drug addicts. Within two years, that number had fallen to 20,000, and was as low as 8,000 by 1969[10].
The presidency created policy through special orders called “enforcement decrees”, which today form a separate category of penal law from legislative acts[11], and provide for rewards for reporting on criminal acts of 50 million won for private individuals, and 10 million for public officials[12]. Since then, drug consumption has been seen more as an issue of criminal activity than as a public health issue[13], and as a threat to the economy and social cohesion. In the first few years of the regime, methadone abuse became the number one issue, and a special drug task force was established and operated in the Seoul District Prosecutors’ Office in 1965. Anti-drug efforts were split between the Police and the Ministry of Health and Welfare[14].
The legal clampdown and anti-drug legislation of the 1970s came during a period of defensive power consolidation by the ruling junta, which had been defeated at the ballot box. This period of reform was called Yushin, or “rejuvenation”, a word derived from the Japanese term for the Meiji reforms[15]. Psychedelics and cannabis are thought to have found their way into the country through US military contacts, and became popular with college students and alternative musicians during the 1970s, and the lack of specific focus on the drug meant that it could often be consumed casually by the small but growing cannabis subculture [16]. Cultivation of cannabis was only tentatively tackled at first, because of its use in traditional textile manufacturing. But it was eventually forbidden under the 1976 Cannabis Control Act, under which the 4 000 ha of hemp farmland were reduced to below 2000[17]. To stamp out the use of cannabis, which enjoyed small but significant subcultural support, Park engaged in the public shaming of celebrities, leading up to legal prohibition in 1976. But unlike Japan, it was not a practice which emerged from the public, but from a deliberate decision by the dictatorship during the early phases of its drug program to consolidate public cooperation, which it achieved by censoring any media seen to be promoting drug consumption[18], and issuing rewards.
Park was assassinated in in 1979, and while military rule continued, a fully democratic constitution was codified in 1988. Despite facing popular hostility during his late presidency, Park was voted the greatest leader in Korean history by 44% of the public in a Gallup poll in 2015[19]. This enduring popularity may have contributed to the longevity of the essential features of the drug policy regime into the reform era. However, one crucial factor is that political partisanship in Korea is not ideologically based, and political parties are more faction-building exercises and regional horse-trading than partisan churches[20]. The major reforms of 1989 and 2000 were carried out by three different governments, but all shared the quality of a reformist regime. The Sixth Republic (1988) put an end to military rule, and 1993 and 1998 saw the first democratic elections, of two former political dissidents, Kim Young-sam, and Kim Dae-jung[21]. Kim Young-sam oversaw massive anti-corruption investigations through his faction in the Assembly while it held a majority leading up to the elections, and his rule was characterized by a great deal of anti-corruption campaigning[22]. This may account for the increase in recorded drug law violations in this period, since the dictatorship’s control of criticism could well have suppressed the statistics.
Based on the success of the Seoul branch under Park, and after methamphetamine use became more widely spread in the 1980s[23], an amendment to an Act of Parliament in 1989 centralised all Prevention efforts under the Supreme Prosecutor’s Office (SPO) and created special task forces deputised to the provincial offices[24]. The SPO is run by appointment, and the attorney general sits for only two years, giving a great deal of control to the office of the president. Authorities expressed alarm at the rise in prevalence of drug abuse in the 90s, which achieved a rate of 10 000 arrests per year in 1999[25], a rate which has fluctuated but remained more or less the same until 2015, when the country experienced a spike up to 14 000[26]. The most popular drug is (as in Japan) methamphetamine, and like in Japan, users tend to be those who have travelled abroad, and are mostly young men[27]. The abusers of this drug are largely in their thirties, and predominantly accountants[28].
While the state managed to stamp out domestic methamphetamine production by 1990 by targeting the import of chemical precursors, final product import became an issue. By 1993, the Intelligence services were employed to monitor trafficking[29]. Increased production in China, the Philippines and North Korea led to a market glut, contributing to the subsequent upward trend in consumption[30]. Hemp production was reintroduced as a textile medium after government-sponsored development of a non-psychoactive variety in 1996, after which regulation was consolidated in the 2000 Law Concerning Drugs Control[31]. Until then, the main bodies of legislature were split between the Narcotics Act of 1957, the Cannabis Control Act of 1976, and the Psychotropic Medicine Act of 1979[32].
Despite a strict penal code, the sentencing program is deliberately flexible, allowing the option of gratis treatment, especially for young and first-time use-offenders[33]. It is understood by the establishment from international-comparative research that compulsion in rehabilitation is likely to hamper success[34]. Free, anonymous rehabilitation services and legal immunity is offered to any citizen who hands themselves in for treatment[35]. Youth awareness has been a special focus since the 2000 Act, but has been deemed insufficient by critics, due to a failure to coordinate national strategies and integrate families[36]. Seeing an increase in the abuse of over-the-counter and prescription medications, the government separated the prescription and dispensation of pharmaceuticals, which has had the effect of reducing consumption in comparison to the remaining 2 % of pharmacies still exempt from the law[37].
The ROK’s focus on trafficking and smuggling differs from Japan’s, in that it has put concerted effort into cultivating an international, cooperative presence, with representatives of the Anti-Drug Liaison Officials’ Meeting for International Cooperation (ADLOMICO) from more than 22 countries, and includes representatives of Interpol the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime[38]. This too operates under the aegis of the SPO[39]. Chinese nationals have been a major link in methamphetamine smuggling since the 1990s, whereas LSD, GHB and other party drugs have been sourced through US Army personnel. Cannabis is mostly sourced from South Africa[40].
One of the prevailing realities of South Korea is that both anecdotally and from survey data, both adult and adolescent, it appears that the Korean Public is extremely averse to drug consumption. Not only that, but hospital records show an almost negligible quantity of drug overdose deaths[41]. However, the influence of foreign drug culture has become disruptive in recent decades[42], at least by East Asian standards. The challenges created by the availability of information and networking over the internet have only begun to be met[43]. The Internet has become a significant vector, creating exposure to global drug culture and online drug markets[44], which has produced a large increase in consumption and smuggling, through foreign direct purchases from online sources, and prompted discussion about new policy reform[45]. Currently, Seoul is going through a new drugs crackdown, band if the past is any indication, it ought to delay the progress of global influence a while longer.
Ultimately what I believe we can learn from the Koreans is something rather profound, but which I hope should be unsurprising to anybody with a long-run view of history: the assertion of control by state authorities has great capacity to shift public morality. The endurance and effectiveness of the Korean drug policy regime can be attributed to the ability to rely on collective consensus, and centralised, yet interdepartmental enforcement. The particular shape of drug consumption and trade in the ROK, as well as the history of Japanese colonialism, American occupation, DPRK manufacture and Chinese trafficking has meant that Prevention is seen in the light of national self-defence. The main supply coming from states with which Korea has had a troubled history has spurred diplomatic efforts to solicit international cooperation. The process of change is based on adaption, escalation and consolidation of past practices rather than radical, though the introduction of free, anonymous medical treatment can be seen as an example of learning from high-volume consumption countries in the West.
References:
[1] Seth, Michael J. A Concise History of Modern Korea: From the Late Nineteenth Century to the Present. 2010: 144
[2] Nanto, Dick K. “North Korea’s Economic Crisis, Reforms, and Policy Implications.” In North Korea: The Politics of Regime Survival, Routledge (2014): 130-154
;Kan, Paul Rexton, Bruce E. Bechtol, and Robert M. Collins. Criminal sovereignty: understanding North Korea’s illicit international activities. No. 36. Strategic Studies Institute (2010)
;Perl, Raphael F. “Drug trafficking and North Korea: Issues for US policy.” Library of Congress, Washington DC Congressional Service, 2007.
[3] APAIC, “National Trends: Republic of Korea”, Synthetic Drug Trends
[4] Park Ji-Young. “War on ‘Red Drugs’: Korean Drug Policy and Anti-Communism, 1945-1960.” Korean Journal of Medical History 25, no. 1 (2016): 77-110.
[5] Movie, A.I., and L.I. Romanova. “Законодательство стран Азиатско-Тихоокеанского региона о преступлениях, предметом которых являются наркотические средства, психотропные вещества и их аналоги.” Наркоконтроль 4 (2008): 19-23..
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[10] Kim Gyu-tae. A Study on the Effective Measures against Smuggling of Foreign Drugs. PhD diss., Korea Maritime University, 2015: 28
[11] Horigan, Damien P. “Observations on the South Korean Penal Code.” J. Korean L. 3 (2003): 147
[12] Cho, Byung-in. “Drug Control Policy in Korea.” Vancouver: International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy, (2004): 28; Kwon, Soo-Jin, Eui-Gi Shin, “The Monetary Reward Program for Drug Crime Reporters” Korean Institute of Criminology Research Series (2006): 11-193.
[13] Chang, Young-Min, Seon-Bok Kim and Jin-Soo Chung. “A Study on Drug Laws in Korea, 1993” Criminal Policy Institute Research Series (1993): 9-149.
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[15] Seth, Michael J. A Concise History of Modern Korea: From the Late Nineteenth Century to the Present. 2010: 183
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[17] Moon, Y.H. “Reviews for legislation of industrial hemp regulation: The proposal to legislate industrial hemp(Cannabis sativa L.) and their research review and regulations in Korea”, The Journal of the Korean Society of International Agriculture Korea Agricultural Science Digital Library (2008)
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[23] Chung, Woo Jin, Hyun Jun Chun, and Sun Mi Lee. “Socioeconomic Costs of Alcohol Drinking in Korea.” Journal of preventive medicine and public health 39, no. 1 (2006)
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[26] Supreme Prosecutor’s Office, White Paper on Drug Control (2017): 105
[27] ji Kwon, Nam, and Eunyoung Han. “A commentary on the effects of methamphetamine and the status of methamphetamine abuse among youths in South Korea, Japan, and China.” Forensic science international 286 (2018): 81-85.
[28] Chung, Woo Jin, Hyun Jun Chun, and Sun Mi Lee. “Socioeconomic Costs of Alcohol Drinking in Korea.” Journal of preventive medicine and public health 39, no. 1 (2006)
[29] Korean Association Against Drug Abuse “Korea’s drug history and coping effort” A Study on Korea ‘s Anti – Drug Policy (2002)
[30] Korean Association Against Drug Abuse “Korea’s drug history and coping effort” A Study on Korea ‘s Anti – Drug Policy (2002)
[31] Moon, Y.H. “Reviews for legislation of industrial hemp regulation: The proposal to legislate industrial hemp(Cannabis sativa L.) and their research review and regulations in Korea”, The Journal of the Korean Society of International Agriculture Korea Agricultural Science Digital Library (2008)
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;Cho, Byung-in. “Trends and Patterns of Methamphetamine Abuse in the Republic of Korea”. 1990 Census of Population and Housing: Summary population and housing characteristics. North Carolina. Vol. 115. Marissa A. Miller, ed. Department of Commerce Economics and Statistics Administration (1991): 108
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[35] Cho, Byung-in. “Trends and Patterns of Methamphetamine Abuse in the Republic of Korea”. 1990 Census of Population and Housing: Summary population and housing characteristics. North Carolina. Vol. 115. Marissa A. Miller, ed. Department of Commerce Economics and Statistics Administration (1991)
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[37] Yuk, Sang Mi, Kyu-Tae Han, Sun Jung Kim, Woorim Kim, Tae Yong Sohn, Byungyool Jeon, Young-Man Kim, and Eun-Cheol Park. “Consumption of pharmaceutical drugs in exception region of separation for drug prescribing and dispensing program in South Korea.” Substance abuse treatment, prevention, and policy 10, no. 1 (2015):
[38] Supreme Prosecutor’s Office, “The 25th ADLOMICO International Conference for the Elimination of Drug Abuse” Official Website (2015
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[40] Kim Gyu-tae. A Study on the Effective Measures against Smuggling of Foreign Drugs. PhD diss., Korea Maritime University, 2015: 33-4
[41] Chung, Heesun, Meejung Park, Eunyoung Hahn, Haeyoung Choi, Hwakyung Choi, and Miae Lim. “Recent trends of drug abuse and drug‐associated deaths in Korea.” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1025, no. 1 (2004)
[42]Cho, Byung-in. “Drug Control Policy in Korea.” Vancouver: International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy, (2004): 5
[43] Korean Association Against Drug Abuse “Korea’s drug history and coping effort” A Study on Korea ‘s Anti – Drug Policy (2002) (Accessed 2019)
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[45] Kim Gyu-tae. A Study on the Effective Measures against Smuggling of Foreign Drugs. PhD diss., Korea Maritime University, 2015.
The Eccentric Flock 